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ABSTRACT
Early studies of business cycles argued that contractions in economic activity were briefer (shorter)
and more violent (rapid) than expansions. This paper systematically investigates this claim and in
the process discovers a robust new business cycle fact: expansions and contractions in output are
equally  brief  and  violent  but  contractions  in  employment  are  briefer  and  more  violent  than
expansions. The difference arises because employment typically lags output around peaks but both
series roughly coincide in their troughs. We discuss the performance of existing business cycle
models in accounting for this fact, and conclude that none can fully account for it. We then show that
a simple model that combines three familiar ingredients–labor hoarding, a choice of when to scrap













rreis@princeton.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a series of studies, Wesley Mitchell (1913, 1927, 1946 with Burns) collected a set of
facts on the U.S. business cycle. Most of them have been thoroughly scrutinized since then
and have survived the test of time. Today, it is well-established that: ﬂuctuations occur in
aggregate activity and not in particular sectors; cycles are recurrent but not periodic; cycles
have at least two diﬀerent stages, expansions and contractions; once the economy enters
one of the stages, it stays there for some time, so detecting turning points is important for
forecasting; and there are regular and predictable co-movements between variables over the
cycle that can be expressed as relative variances and lead-and-lag correlations.1
There is another fact, however, that while emphasized by Mitchell in all of his works,
has not received as much attention. In his words: “Business contractions appear to be
briefer and more violent than business expansions.” (Mitchell, 1927: 333). The main aim
of this paper is to empirically investigate whether this belongs among the set of business
cycle stylized facts.
To answer this question, we consider diﬀerent measures of business activity both in
the product market (industrial production, GDP, personal income, sales, etc.) and in
the labor market (the unemployment rate, total employment, etc.). We use diﬀerent de-
trending procedures and several algorithms to detect peaks and troughs in the data and
split each time-series into expansions and contractions. We measure the brevity of an
expansion (contraction) as the number of periods from trough (peak) to peak (trough), and
we measure violence by considering diﬀerent estimators of the rate of change in business
activity. Finally, we compare brevity and violence during expansions and contractions by
looking at their averages and their distributions, both visually and statistically.
After going over hundreds of diﬀerent combinations of these methods, we reach one
robust conclusion: contrary to Mitchell’s claim, expansions and contractions in output are
equally brief and violent but, just as Mitchell wrote, contractions in employment are briefer
and more violent than expansions. The diﬀerence between output and employment comes
from a diﬀerence in the timing of turning points: peaks in employment typically lag peaks
in output, whereas the troughs in both series are roughly coincident. Because we ﬁnd that
these patterns are so robust, we propose them as a new business cycle fact.
1Zarnowitz (1992) and Stock and Watson (1999) summarize the established business cycle facts.
2The second contribution of this paper is to ask whether existing business cycle models
can account for this fact. We conclude that there is no available theory that can simul-
taneously account for all of its parts. While some theories can explain why output and
unemployment can move in opposite directions during parts of the business cycle, or why
contractions in employment are briefer than expansions, or why contractions in employment
are more violent than expansions, there is no existing single theory that can account for all
three parts of the fact.
We then present a simple theory that can qualitatively account for the fact by combining
three ingredients. The ﬁrst ingredient is labor hoarding: if ﬁrms can vary production
by changing the number of employees (an extensive margin) or the number of hours per
worker (an intensive margin), then output and employment can move diﬀerently during
the business cycle. The second ingredient is technology adoption or the optimal timing
of creative destruction: if ﬁrms can sustain ageing technologies for a while, expansions in
employment can persist even when output has started declining. The third ingredient is
that job separations can occur abruptly while job creations take time, accounting for the
asymmetry in the violence of employment changes. This is the case in theories of training
that emphasize that employers can ﬁre quickly but need time to train new workers, and in
theories of job search in which employees can quit quickly but need time to ﬁnd a new job.
Section 2 of the paper presents a baseline case that illustrates the new business cycle
fact. Section 3 discusses our methods for measuring the brevity and violence of contractions
and expansions more systematically and exhaustively. Section 4 contains our main results,
while section 5 considers their robustness. Section 6 uses our ﬁndings to evaluate existing
theories of asymmetric business cycles and section 7 presents a new simple model to match
the facts. Section 8 concludes and discusses the implications of our ﬁndings for European
unemployment hysteresis and jobless recoveries.
The related literature
There is a large empirical literature on asymmetric business cycles that we cannot do
full justice to here. Relative to this paper, the literature ﬁts broadly into three branches.
The ﬁrst branch, starting with Neftci (1984) and DeLong and Summers (1986) looks at
skewness in either the level or in the changes in economic activity.2 Skewness in levels
2See also Falk (1986), Sichel (1989, 1993), Rothman (1991), Verbrugge (1997), Belaire-Franch and Peiro
3would imply that the economy spends more time above or below trend. Our emphasis is
instead on the behavior of the economy when it is expanding or contracting. Skewness in
changes evaluates whether economic activity is more likely to increase or to fall. Yet, while
economic activity is generally rising during an expansion, there are some periods where it
actually falls. Using our data, we ﬁnd that in a typical U.S. expansion, output actually
falls about one-ﬁfth of the times, and in a typical contraction, output actually rises during
one-fourth of the periods. An asymmetry between the dates when economic activity falls
and rises does not imply or is implied by an asymmetry between the business cycle phases
of expansion and contraction. While skewness is interesting in its own right, it does not
address the brevity and violence of expansions and contractions.
A second branch in the literature, starting with the seminal contribution of Hamil-
ton (1989), estimates regime-switching models and examines whether there are diﬀerences
between the two regimes.3 The typical ﬁnding in these studies is that the dynamics of
recessions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the dynamics of booms. Our paper distinguishes
itself from this literature because we are not looking at whether contractions are generally
diﬀerent from expansions. Rather, we focus on a more speciﬁcd i ﬀerence: whether they are
briefer and more violent. This focus allows ust ob em o r ep r e c i s ea n dt oh a v em o r ep o w e r f u l
tests of this particular type of asymmetry. It implies, of course, that even if we fail to ﬁnd
diﬀerences in brevity and violence, there may still be other forms of asymmetry.
A third branch of the empirical literature has focused on speciﬁc types of asymmetries.
McQueen and Thorley (1993) found that peaks tend to be round, while troughs are sharp.
Diebold and Rudebusch (1990) found no evidence that expansions and contractions are
duration dependent–whether they are more likely to end as they last longer.4 Finally,
Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) and Watson (1994) compared the duration of expansions
and contractions in the post-war not to each other but to the equivalent moments in pre
World War II data. Relative to these articles, this paper focusses on a diﬀerent type of
asymmetry and compares post-war expansions and contractions.
(2003), and Bai and Ng (2005).
3See Acemoglu and Scott (1994), Ramsey and Rothman (1995), and Hamilton (2005) who use close vari-
ants of the Hamilton model. Beaudry and Koop (1993), Hussey (1992), Hess and Iwata (1997), Montgomery
et al (1998), Rothman (1998), and Koop and Potter (1999) use other non-linear models to look for business
cycle asymmetries. Clements and Krolzig (2003) bridge the two ﬁrst branches of the literature, using a
regime-switching model to look for skewness.
4See also McCulloch (1975), Sichel (1991), Durland and McCurdy (1994), and Lam (2004).
4Relative to previous empirical work, this paper therefore contributes the investigation
of one new type of asymmetry (brevity and violence) between the two states of the business
cycle (contractions and expansions) and systematically comparing output to employment.
Regarding theory, there are several existing models of business cycle asymmetries. Some
have argued that some constraints bind during booms but not recessions or vice-versa,
whether they are credit constraints (Kocherlakota, 2000) or capacity constraints (Gilchrist
and Williams, 2000, and Hansen and Prescott, 2005). Others have emphasized learning
about productivity (Chalkley and Lee, 1998, and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006)
or mismatches between skills and technologies (Jovanovic, 2006). An alternative is that
during periods of lower activity, it is cheaper to adopt new technologies (Caballero and
Hammour, 1996) or to ﬁll a job vacancy (Burgess, 1992). Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
note that jobs are destroyed as soon as their value is negative, but it takes time for potential
matches with positive value to form. Millard et al. (1997) investigate the performance
of some of these models above at ﬁtting the persistence of unemployment in response to
shocks during recessions and booms. We provide two main contributions to this theoretical
literature. First, our new business cycle fact puts forward a new challenge to these models.
Second, we propose a simple new model that can account for the fact.
2A b e n c h m a r k c a s e
We start our empirical investigation by looking at one speciﬁc case. The most common
measure of business activity is quarterly real GDP. We de-trend the log of this series using
am o d i ﬁed HP ﬁlter due to Rotemberg (1999) that avoids some of the problems that the
conventional HP ﬁlter has at the edges of the sample. Then, we identify peaks and troughs
using the standard algorithm of Bry and Boschan (1971).5 The top panel of ﬁgure 1 shows
the periods of expansion and contraction in output.
To measure brevity, we simply compute the average number of quarters during expan-
sions and contractions. The average expansion in GDP lasted 11.5 quarters, whereas the
average contraction lasted 9.5 quarters. A simple t-test of equal duration versus the al-
ternative of longer expansions has a p-value of 0.22. Looking at the whole distribution of
5Both the Rotemberg modiﬁed HP ﬁlter and the Bry and Boschan algorithm will be described in more
detail in section 3.
5durations, we ﬁnd that only 60% of expansions were longer than the median duration of a
contraction. Moving next to violence, we compute the average change in the series during
expansions and contractions. The average growth of GDP during an expansion is 0.49%,
while average growth during a contraction is -0.51%. A t-test that these numbers add up to
zero has a p-value of 0.44 so, at typical signiﬁcance levels, we accept the null hypothesis of
equal violence. Moreover, again only 60% of expansions were less violent than the median
contraction, and the distribution of violence in expansions is very similar to the distribution
in contractions. This baseline case therefore contradicts Mitchell’s assertion.
Result 1: Expansions and contractions in output are equally brief and violent.
[...FIGURE 1...]
To investigate further, we look at another series: the log of 1 minus the unemployment
rate. The state of the labor market is sometimes seen as being as important as the level of
GDP to assess the state of the business cycle, and the unemployment rate is its most used
measure. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the expansions and contractions in this series,
again after using the modiﬁed-HP ﬁlter and the Bry and Boschan algorithm.
The results for employment are strikingly diﬀerent from those for GDP. The average
expansion in employment lasted 18 quarters, 10 quarters more than the average contraction.
The test that these are equal has a t-statistic of 2.63, and a p-value of 0.00 against the one-
sided alternative that contractions are briefer. In fact, in the entire sample, there isn’t a
single expansion that lasted shorter than the median duration of a contraction. The data
overwhelmingly points to shorter contractions than expansions in employment. Moving to
violence, the average growth rate of employment during an average expansion was 0.18%
whereas the average growth during contractions was more than double: -0.39%. The t-
statistic is 3.41, which overwhelmingly rejects equality in the absolute value of growth
rates in favor of the alternative that contractions are more violent. Looking at the whole
distribution, every single expansion in employment in the post-war had an average growth
rate lower than the median absolute growth rate during a contraction. Therefore, focussing
on employment leads to the opposite conclusion from looking at output.
Result 2: Contractions in employment are briefer and more violent than expansions.
To understand why output and employment are so diﬀerent, ﬁgure 2 plots the average
6business cycle dynamics of both series. Starting from each employment trough, we recorded
output and employment before and after 20 quarters, and averaged these over cycles. We
also recorded the date of the previous and next peak in both employment and GDP, as well
as the date of the nearer trough in GDP. The ﬁgure shows that employment and output
both trough at around the same time. On average, troughs in employment lag output by
only 0.13 quarters or about 12 days. The diﬀerence in duration between the two series
therefore comes almost exclusively from peaks in employment lagging those in output by
about 2.25 quarters or 203 days. Employment therefore is a lagging indicator of output
cycles only when coming down but not when going up.
Result 3: Employment lags output at peaks but coincides with it at troughs.
[...FIGURE 2...]
Part of the diﬀerence between output and employment is due to the two brief cycles in
the late 1960s and mid 1990s that appear in GDP but not in the employment rate (or the
NBER). Excluding those two cycles, the case for briefer and more violent contractions in
output slightly strengthens but remains very weak. In this case, the average expansion now
lasts 15.9 quarters and the average contraction 10.2 quarters, with a p-value of 0.06 in a
test of equality between the two. Growth during an average expansion is now 0.51% while
that during an average contraction is -0.59%, and the p-value is now 0.25. Result 1 is not
just due to more output cycles.
Why are the NBER dates so diﬀerent from our output cycles? Because the NBER
eclectically looks at many series to reach its decisions, we cannot deﬁnitely answer this
question. Still, we can oﬀer some clues. Using the Bry and Boschan algorithm on GDP that
is not de-trended, we can reproduce almost exactly the NBER dates. Since output trends
up, only in rare instances does it actually decline leading the NBER to call a contraction.
The positive trend automatically leads to longer expansions and shorter contractions, so the
question of whether contractions are brief and violent stops being interesting with trending
data. Moreover, an increase in trend growth automatically leads to even rarer contractions,
so brevity and violence in trending data depend on the trend, not just on the cycle. For
both reasons, we work with de-trended data.6
6The NBER itself has not always been consistent about de-trending. While post 1927, it has focussed
7To conclude, ﬁgure 3 summarizes the peak-to-peak dynamics of output and employment
suggested by the three results. Starting from a trough, employment in a recovery rises at
a slower pace than output. Output eventually reaches its peak and starts falling, while
employment keeps rising at a tame pace. Only almost 7 months after the peak in output
does employment ﬁnally reach its peak, after which it falls sharply catching up with output
at the next trough.
[...FIGURE 3...]
3 Measurement algorithms and methods for testing
Our empirical investigation requires a measure of business activity, an algorithm that de-
trends it, picks turning points and measures brevity and violence, and a method to system-
atically compare them.
3.1 The series and de-trending
For our baseline results, we measure output using the log of industrial production (IP) and
employment using the log of one minus the unemployment rate. Our data are quarterly
and cover the period from 1948:1 to 2005:1.
As explained earlier, we remove the upward trend in output. The unemployment rate
does not trend up or down, but it has a signiﬁcant low frequency component driven by
demographic changes. Using the raw series can lead to misleadingly observing very short or
very long business cycle phases around the time of changes in this component. Therefore,
we also de-trend unemployment.7
There is no consensus on what is the best way to de-trend economic series. We use four
algorithms that broadly capture four diﬀerent views of the source of trends. The ﬁrst view
sees trends as deterministic but subject to occasional abrupt changes in growth rates. To
represent this view, we compute the trend by ﬁtting a linear regression of time, allowing
for breaks in the slope in 1973:4 and 1995:4 to capture the productivity slowdown.8 The
on trending data, Romer (1994) convincingly shows that the business cycle dates for the 1884-1927 period
came from looking at de-trended data. This is consistent with Mitchell’s own view, which seems to have
hesitated between de-trending or not, as discussed by Romer.
7Cycles on de-trended data are sometimes called “growth cycles” (Zarnowitz, 1989).
8We experimented with close alternatives dates for the breaks and found no substantial diﬀerences.
8second view agrees that the trend is deterministic, but models changes that occur smoothly.
We ﬁt a polynomial function of time to the series, using measures of goodness of ﬁtt op i c k
the order of the polynomial. The third view associates trends with possibly stochastic
movements aﬀecting the low frequency of a series. We use the Baxter and King (1999)
band-pass ﬁlter to extract cycles of duration between 6 and 32 quarters. For output, we
found that other choices than the conventional 6-32 led to very similar results. For the
unemployment rate, it is more common to extract only very low frequency trends, so we
also pursue the alternative 2-80 quarters speciﬁcation for the band-pass ﬁlter. This leads to
somewhat diﬀerent implications for the measured violence of unemployment, which we will
discuss later. A fourth view of the trend insists that it should be smooth and uncorrelated
with the cycle. We calculate it using the minimization algorithm of Rotemberg (1999),
which builds on the Hodrick-Prescott procedure but performs better at the edge of the
sample.9
3.2 Detecting expansions and contractions
Expansions and contractions are deﬁned by peaks and troughs. The peak of the cycle
marks the end of an expansion and the beginning of a contraction, while the trough marks
the end of a contraction and the beginning of an expansion.10 We consider four diﬀerent
algorithms to detect peaks and troughs; each has virtues and ﬂaws, so by considering several
we ensure the robustness of the results. There are certainly alternatives, but we pick these
four as broadly representative of the available menu.11 The appendix describes each method
formally.
The ﬁrst method, which we label the window method, searches for local extremes. It
starts by smoothing the series using a 5-quarter centered moving average to remove high-
frequency noise. Then, at each date, it forms a symmetric window with N quarters around
each side of the date. If the date is a maximum (minimum) in the window, then it becomes
a candidate peak (trough). Finally, to ensure that peaks and troughs alternate, we take the
9We obtained very similar results using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Missing from our list of de-trending
algorithms are unobserved-components models. We avoided these because they impose tight statistical
restrictions on the series that aﬀect their symmetry.
10Note that expansions and contractions are not booms and recessions. The latter refer to the economy
being above or below trend, whereas expansions and contractions refer to it rising or falling. A boom includes
both the ﬁnal part of an expansion and the initial part of a contraction.
11For a discussion of alternative methods to pick turning points, see Canova (1999), Harding and Pagan
(2002), and Zarnowitz and Ozyildirim (2002).
9later of two consecutive peaks (troughs). We chose N so that the number of turning points
was not too diﬀerent from the number found by the NBER. We set N=5, but the results
are similar if N is 3 or 7.
Second is the reversal method, which looks for reversals in the successive changes in
the series. This method ﬁnds peaks at dates which are preceded by N periods of succes-
sive increases and N-1 quarters of successive decreases. Troughs are dates preceded by N
decreases and followed by N-1 increases. This method captures the often-held view that a
contraction is a period of some quarters of negative growth. We chose N=3, for the same
reasons as in the window method.
Third is the Bry and Boschan (1971) approach. Bry and Boschan found that their
algorithm reproduces the set of turning points picked by Burns and Mitchell (1946) and the
NBER. King and Plosser (1994) and Watson (1994) also used this method to detect turning
points. While the exact algorithm contains several steps, it can be broadly described as
follows. First, the algorithm smooths the series using a 1-year centered moving average and
looks for peaks and troughs in a manner akin to the window method. Second, it smooths the
series using an alternative moving average (a Spencer ﬁl t e r )t h a ta l l o w si tt oh a v es h a r p e r
changes, and again looks for turning points. Third, it looks for turning points in a shorter
(3-month) centered moving average. Finally, the algorithm looks for peaks and troughs in
the unsmoothed series using a series of criteria to eliminate mistakes that may be caused
by erratic movements.
Our fourth algorithm is in the Markov regime-switching tradition and is due to Chauvet
and Hamilton (2005). It assumes that a series x(t) alternates between two states, so either
x(t)=x1(t) or x(t)=x2(t). The state is a latent variable that follows a ﬁrst-order Markov
chain where the probability of staying in state 1 is p1 and the probability of staying in state
2i sp2.I ne a c hs t a t e ,∆x1(t) ∼ N(μ1,σ2
1) and ∆x2(t) ∼ N(μ2,σ2
2). Associated with this
statistical model is a likelihood function that we can maximize to ﬁnd estimates of the six
parameters (p1,p 2,μ 1,μ 2,σ2
1,σ2
2). Note that we use this approach, not as a model of the
stochastic process, but solely as an algorithm to provide a statistic of the sample path. It
provides estimates at each date of the probability of being in either of the two states, that we
use to deﬁne expansions as the dates when the probability of being in the high-mean state
is higher than 50%, and contractions when it falls below 50%. In practice the estimated
probability is above 80% and below 20% most of the time, so the results are not sensitive
10to the 50%-cutoﬀ rule. An important caveat to this approach is that it does not impose
that the two states correspond to expansions and contractions. Indeed, when we use this
algorithm, we ﬁnd that the two states corresponded to pre and post 1984, marking the fall
in output volatility that has been called “The Great Moderation.” We extend the model
to allow for σ2
1 and σ2
2 to diﬀer pre and post 1984:3, raising the number of parameters to
eight.12 While the states identiﬁed by the algorithm then more closely resemble expansions
and contractions, one should still keep this caveat in mind.
3.3 Measuring brevity and violence
We call the duration of a contraction the number of periods from peak to trough. The du-
ration of an expansion is the number of periods from trough to peak. Brevity is understood
as smaller duration.
Violence r e f e r st ot h er a t eo fc h a n g eo fx(t) while in an expansion or in a contraction. We
use three related measures of violence. The ﬁrst and simplest is steepness: the (absolute
value of) the average change in the series. It captures well the idea that a contraction
is violent if activity is falling quickly. Note that, for a de-trended series, the numerator in
steepness (the total change in the series from one turning point to the next) must on average
be the same for expansions and contractions. Since the denominator in steepness equals
duration, then a brief series will tend to be a violent series as well, although not necessarily
so. Our second measure of violence is sharpness, and it equals the square root of the average
squared change in x(t). It is easy to show that sharpness2 = steepness2 + VA R (∆x(t)).
A contraction is therefore sharper if it is steep but also if the series jerks around by more
during contractions than during expansions. Our third measure, slope, is the least-squares
coeﬃcient on a linear trend from a regression of x(t) on the trend and an intercept. The
ﬁrst two measures are sensitive to the exact location of peaks and troughs, whereas slope
is more robust to measurement error in spotting these dates.
If during a contraction (or expansion) a series falls exactly linearly, then steepness =
sharpness = slope. Otherwise, sharpness adds to steepness a measure of how volatile the
series is, while slope makes the measure of violence less dependent on the exact location of
12We have looked at a few quarters before and after this exact date and obtained similar results. A less




2, since it constrains diﬀerences in violence solely to diﬀerences in
μi. When we tried this alternative, the resulting turning points were quite similar.
11the turning points.
3.4 Statistical inference









. The index i refers
to the cycle within a series, while p indexes the procedure used to transform the data,
to identify turning points, and to measure violence. We employ three approaches to infer
whether contractions are diﬀerent from expansions.
First, we plot the cumulative distribution functions (cdf’s) for each measure across i,
and see whether the cdf for the duration of contractions tends to lie to the left of the cdf for
expansions, while the reverse describes the cdf’s for violence. This allows us to graphically
infer whether contractions tend to be briefer and more violent than expansions. At the
extreme, if F(DC(.,p)) ≥ F(DE(.,p)) and F(V C(.,p)) ≤ F(V E(.,p)), then the duration
of expansions ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the duration of contractions, while the
opposite is true of violence.
Second, we test the null hypotheses of equal average duration E[DE(.,p)] = E[DC(.,p)]
against the one-sided alternative of shorter contractions E[DC(.,p)] <E [DE(.,p)],a n d
equal violence E[V E(.,p)] = E[V C(.,p)] against more violence in contractions E[V C(.,p)] >
E[V E(.,p)]. If duration and violence are independent over i, then a standard t-test of
equality of means is eﬃcient in a ﬁnite sample under normality, and asymptotically eﬃcient
otherwise. The assumption of independence may be an issue. Section 4.4 investigates
whether it it so, by using a bootstrap to produce distributions for the t-statistic when the
duration and violence are correlated across successive cycles.
Third, we test the null hypothesis that the distributions from which duration and vi-
olence are drawn are the same for expansions and contractions. To test this null, we use
a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, computing the exact p-values for each sample size. Diebold
and Rudebusch (1992) note that this test can be quite eﬃc i e n te v e ni ns m a l ls a m p l e s . I t
also requires the assumption of independent draws, so we again employ the bootstrap to
calculate its distribution if there is serial correlation.
One possible criticism of these tests is that they treat the D(.) and the V (.) as observa-
tions, even though these are the product of the algorithms that we described so far. We do
not think that this is a matter of too much concern. Most macroeconomic series, like output
12or consumption, are also the result of algorithms with many steps that add, subtract, aver-
age, interpolate and smooth. Since our algorithms are symmetric, they do not create any
asymmetry between expansions and contractions beyond the one already in the data. Still,
we address this concern in section 4.4. We use estimated symmetric models for output and
employment to generate artiﬁcial times-series for these of the same length as our sample
on which we apply our algorithms and tests. We repeat this for many artiﬁcial series and
investigate whether we could erroneously draw the wrong conclusions regarding brevity and
violence of contractions and expansions in these symmetric-by-construction observations.
4M a i n r e s u l t s
Figure 4 plots the cdf’s for output for brevity across all 16 methods (4 for de-trending and
4 for detecting turning points). The distributions typically lie on top of each other without
a discernible diﬀerence between expansions and contractions. In contrast, ﬁgure 5 plots
the cdf’s for the duration of unemployment. In almost all cases, the distribution during
expansions either strictly stochastically dominates that for contractions or almost always
lies to the right of it.
[...FIGURES 4 AND 5...]
Tables 1a to 1d present the average duration of expansions and contractions, as well
as the t and W statistics and the respective p-values for the tests of equal means and
equal distributions. While the results vary across diﬀerent methods, the average length
of an expansion in output is about 11 quarters long, whereas the average contraction is
about 8 quarters long. In most cases, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. However, the average length of an expansion in unemployment is about 16 quarters,
whereas the average length of a contraction is only about 7 quarters long. The diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for most cases, and at the 1% level for many of them. With
regards to duration, the data strongly suggests that contractions in employment are briefer
than expansions in employment, but contractions and expansions in output are equally long.
[...TABLES 1a, 1b, 1c, AND 1d...]
13To understand what lies behind the diﬀerence in brevity, within each method, we com-
pared the dates at which peaks and troughs occur in output and in employment. The
typical ﬁnding is that peaks in employment lag peaks in output by between 1 and 3 quar-
ters, whereas troughs in employment are typically within one quarter of troughs in output.
The brevity in the contractions in employment is due to employment starting to decline
only after output has already been declining for some time. The contractions in both output
and employment end around the same time.
T u r n i n gt ov i o l e n c e ,ﬁgures 6a to 6c show the cdf’s for the three measures of violence in
output. As with duration, the cdf’s for violence in expansions and contractions are typically
very close, except when the Chauvet-Hamilton algorithm is used. In ﬁgures 7a to 7c are
the cdf’s for the violence of unemployment. The typical ﬁnding is that contractions are
substantially more violent than expansions.
[...FIGURES 6a, 6b, 6c, 7a, 7b, AND 7c...]
Tables 2a to 2d show the results from the t and W tests. There are now some rejections
of symmetry for output, although for the large majority of the cases, we accept the null
hypotheses of equal mean or equal distribution of violence in expansions and contractions in
output. Out of the 96 tests, we reject symmetry at the 5% signiﬁcance level only in 12 cases,
and only once at the 1% level, and all of these rejections occur when the Chauvet-Hamilton
algorithm for picking turning points is used. The robust conclusion is that contractions and
expansions in output are equally violent.
In employment, on the other hand, most tests (73 out of 96) reject the null at the 5%
level. Curiously, almost all of the acceptances (21 out of 23) arise in the case when the
band-pass ﬁlter is used to extract de-trend unemployment as corresponding to ﬂuctuations
between 6 and 32 quarters. Table 2e uses instead the band-pass ﬁlter to extract the ﬂuctu-
ations between 2 and 80 quarters, thus only removing the very low frequency movements in
unemployment that are associated with demographic changes. Note that in this case, the
inferences for output are almost unchanged. For employment however, instead of only 3
rejections at the 5% level, there are now 16 rejections. There is no answer as to what is the
right choice of parameters for the band-pass ﬁlter, but we can oﬀer two observations. First,
that the typical choices in the literature on unemployment are closer to those in table 2e.
Second, that in both tables 2d and 2e, employment is more likely to be asymmetric than
14output, in the sense of lower p-values. We therefore conclude that, while the results with
regards to violence are not as overwhelming as with regards to brevity, the evidence strongly
supports the view that contractions in employment are more violent than expansions.
[...TABLES 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, AND 2e...]
5 Inspecting the robustness of the results
5.1 The frequency of the observations
One may fear that quarterly data might not be ﬁne enough to accurately detect turning
points. It is unclear that this would bias our measures of brevity and violence in any
particular direction, or that it would do so diﬀerentially for output and employment. Still,
it is conceivable that if, for instance, employment typically peaks in January, April, July,
and October then quarterly data will induce a systematic delay in identifying these peaks.
Table 3 reports the results from our algorithms and tests using monthly seasonally-
adjusted observations for industrial production and the unemployment rate. To conserve
space, we report only the average brevity and violence across all methods and the number of
times that the null hypotheses are rejected at the 5% and 1% levels. As before, the evidence
for no asymmetry between expansions and contractions in output is strong. There are very
few rejections of the nulls and they are almost all due to using the Chauvet-Hamilton
algorithm. For employment, the results are not as strong as those with quarterly data, but
one stills rejects symmetry for the majority of cases.
[...TABLE 3...]
5.2 The series used
In this section we investigate whether there is something special about the series for indus-
trial production and the unemployment rate that is inducing our results.
Turning ﬁrst to output, we extend our analysis to consider GDP and non-farm business
output to ensure that our results are not driven by some speciﬁc features of the industrial
sector. As a second check, we see whether inventories or indirect taxes and depreciation may
enhance or abate asymmetries by considering series for real sales and real personal income.
15As a third check, we break output into consumption, investment and government spending
and look for asymmetries in these series. Table 4 displays the results. The basic statistical
inference, that contractions and expansions are equally brief and violent is unchanged.
We have also compared the timing of peaks and troughs across the diﬀerent output
series. Excluding government expenditures, the dates are typically similar, within 2 quarters
of each other in most cases. This gives us some conﬁdence that our dating of turning points
correctly identiﬁes the business cycle in output.
[...TABLE 4...]
Looking next at employment, so far we have focussed on the log of one minus the
unemployment rate. To investigate whether it is the labor force or total employment that is
creating the asymmetry, we look for brevity and violence in the total number of employed
according to the household survey. Table 5 shows that contractions in total employment
are still briefer and more violent than expansions, though there are not as many rejections
of symmetry as before.
An alternative is to use the payroll employment numbers from the payroll survey. This
survey is often judged to be more reliable because it covers more workers. However, it is
probably less accurate for the purpose of detecting turning points, because of the diﬃculties
in accounting for ﬁrm births and deaths. It takes at least nine months for a new ﬁrm to
get into the sample for the payroll survey. The BLS adjusts the raw data for ﬁrm births
and deaths by ﬁrst imputing the growth rate of ﬁrms that cannot be sampled to equal the
growth of those sampled and then ﬁtting an ARIMA model to the actual net birth/death
data from unemployment insurance records from the past 5 years to adjust the imputation.
Both the imputation and the short sample of the ARIMA can bias the survey towards failing
to detect sharp reversals. Table 5 performs our analysis using total employment from the
payroll survey. There is stronger evidence of asymmetry now than when the household
survey was used. We should also note that for both measures of employment there were
many more rejections at signiﬁcance levels between 5% and 10%. The presentation of the
results in Table 5 underemphasizes the pervasiveness of asymmetries.
[...TABLE 5...]
16Next, we look separately at the employment rate for younger and older workers. The
evidence of briefer and more violent contractions is stronger among workers over 24 than it
is for workers between 16 and 24, but it is present for both.
Another labor market variable that attracts considerable attention is the participation
rate. It is well-established that the labor force expands and shrinks during the business
cycle with the participation rate typically lagging the business cycle. When we applied our
algorithms to participation, we found that we could typically not reject the null of symmetry.
However, we also could typically not ﬁnd many turning points, since the participation rate
does not ﬂuctuate very much, so we should not put too much weight on these results.
Finally, we looked at hours per worker. Table 5 shows the results, which indicate that,
typically, contractions and expansions are equally brief and violent, although there are
some rejections. The results are less clear-cut for this variable, and its turning points can
sometimes be quite diﬀerent than those found for employment or output. We could not
draw any conclusive inference on whether hours per worker resemble output or employment
the most when it comes to asymmetries on duration and violence.
Table 6 looks at a series from another time period: monthly pig-iron production between
1877 and 1929. If one looks solely at the t-test for same average duration, then there is
considerable evidence for shorter contractions than expansions in this output series that
Mitchell and others focussed on. However, looking at either the Wilcoxon test or at any of
the measures of violence, the evidence for asymmetry is much weaker.
[...TABLE 6...]
5.3 Inspecting the turning-point algorithms
Another potential worry is that our algorithms for ﬁnding turning points may be unduly
aﬀecting the results. Partly, we have addressed this fear by using four diﬀerent algorithms
and ﬁnding that they give similar results. One may still have issues with the speciﬁcs of
each algorithm and we try to address these here.
A ﬁrst concern arises with the window algorithm. When it identiﬁes two successive
candidate peaks (or troughs), we took the latter. Our reasoning was that, during expansions,
the series may have very short-lived blips downward that lead to incorrectly detecting a peak
there. The reverse reasoning applies to contractions. We also tried an alternative selection
17rule, that takes the higher of the two candidate peaks. We found that the dates of turning
points were almost entirely unchanged.
While the algorithms treat expansions and contractions symmetrically, one may still
wonder whether they have some hidden feature that leads to asymmetries. We implement a
simple and eﬀective test of this possibility. Taking each series, we reverse its time-ordering
and run our algorithms. Looking from the perspective of the present in the direction of the
past, expansions now become contractions and contractions become expansions. We found
that the algorithms pick out the same turning point dates in 87% of the cases, with the
failures evenly distributed between peaks and troughs.
Yet a third strategy to check whether the algorithms are doing the right job is to
simulate artiﬁcial data and see whether the right turning points are detected. As a data-
generating process we use a Chauvet-Hamilton model with parameters that imply symmetric
expansions and contractions.13 We simulated 1000 samples of the same length as our data,
and ran our turning-point algorithms on each, recording whether they detected turning
point at the right dates. We found that all four of our methods to detect turning points
have a close to 100% success rate, as long as the preceding expansion (or contraction) lasts
for more than 2 quarters. Only in the unlikely event that an expansion (or contraction)
lasts for less than 6 months do our algorithms fail to detect the turning point.
A fourth concern might be that the diﬀerence that we ﬁnd between output and employ-
ment is driven by ﬁnding many short and symmetric cycles for output and only a few and
very asymmetric cycles for employment. While our results highlight the need to consider
cycles for output and employment separately, if the two series had a very diﬀerent total
number of cycles, one would grow suspicious. We checked if this was the case by computing
the diﬀerence between the number of cycles in output and in employment. The average dif-
ference across the 16 classiﬁcations was 1.2, so the algorithms are detecting approximately
the same number of cycles in output and employment, and excluding the extra cycles in
output, as we did in section 2, does not alter the results.
13The choices of parameters values will be described in section 4.4.
185.4 Robustness of the statistical tests
The t and W tests have two potentially worrisome features. First, they are based on
small samples of expansions and contractions, typically around 23. Second, they use the
assumption of independent draws of duration and violence. We address both concerns using
one Monte Carlo experiment that allows for serial correlation.
It is possible that if an expansion lasts longer than average, then perhaps the next
contraction is shorter (or longer) than average. For instance, the last two long expansions
in the U.S. were followed by short contractions. We started by estimating an AR(1) on the
sequence of durations for contractions and expansions demeaned by their group averages.
Using the series that results from a polynomial trend and the window-method on output,
the autoregressive coeﬃcient is 0.2. Notwithstanding the recent experience, typically in the
post-war, a longer-than-usual expansion (contraction) is followed by a longer-than usual
contraction (expansion).14 The autoregressive parameter for unemployment is 0.6.
The next step was to simulate artiﬁcial samples of data. We use the estimated AR(1)
but set the mean duration of both recessions and contractions to 7.9 quarters. Using this
symmetric data generating process, we draw innovations from a normal distribution to
generate 23 observations. We then run our algorithms and construct the t and W statistics.
Repeating this 1000 times generates an empirical distribution for these statistics, under
the assumption of symmetry but now allowing for serial correlation. Table 7 compares
the t and W statistics that we obtained in the actual data with these distributions. The
bootstrap p-values for the test of symmetry in duration are quite close to those using the
asymptotic distributions, although (as expected) they tend to be more conservative. Still,
for the majority of cases, as before we reject symmetry for employment but do not reject it
for output.
[...TABLE 7...]
We use a similar bootstrap for the three measures of violence. The results are in tables
8a to 8d, and the conclusions are similar to those in table 7. The bootstrap p-values are
14The coeﬃcient is around 0.2 across all methods of de-trending and all methods for detecting turning
points, with one exception. The durations identiﬁed by the Chauvet-Hamilton algorithm lead to an auto-
correlation parameter that is negative but close to zero.
19quite close to the asymptotic p-values and the statistical signiﬁcance tests at the 5% or 1%
level lead to almost always the same conclusion.
[...TABLES 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d...]
A second concern with our tests is that we treat the D(.) and the V (.) as observations.
Insofar as these are measured with error, the standard errors used for our tests may under-
estimate the sampling error. We conduct a second Monte Carlo exercise to investigate this
issue. We use a Chauvet-Hamilton model as a data-generating process, with the Markov
transition own-probabilities both set to 0.90, so that the average duration of contractions
and expansions is 10 quarters for both output and unemployment. We allow the variances
to change pre and post 1984, but impose that the changes in the series in the two states
have the same mean and variance. These are then estimated for output and unemployment
separately. Using this symmetric data-generating process, we simulate 1000 samples for
output and unemployment. Treating these as data, for each sample we run our algorithm
to detect turning points and construct the t and W statistics. Tables 9 and 10a to 10d
display the p-values for our statistics in the real data, using the simulated distributions.
[...TABLES 9, 10a, 10b, 10c, AND 10d...]
The results are a little surprising. It turns out that the p-values are typically lower than
before. The rejections of symmetry for employment are stronger than before, whereas for
output, one can still typically not reject symmetry at least at the 5% level. The exception is
when the Chauvet-Hamilton algorithm to detect turning points is used. For these cases the
p-values increase considerably. The combination of the results in tables 7 to 10 indicates
that the window, reversal and Bry and Boschan methods coupled with t and W tests, do
surprisingly better than expected at assessing the symmetry of expansions and contractions.
5.5 An alternative approach to statistical inference
An alternative approach to statistical inference to the one we have taken so far is to com-
mit to a statistical model that completely characterizes the observations of output and
employment and allows for, but does not require, asymmetries between expansions and
20contractions. With this model in hand, one can then test for symmetry between expansions
and contractions. We pursue this alternative in this section.
Our model of the data is the version of the Chauvet-Hamilton model described in section
3. Whereas in that section, the model was treated as an algorithm to detect turning
points, here it is treated as a full statistical representation of the data on output and




2,post) are estimated by
maximum likelihood. We then use likelihood-ratio tests for the null hypotheses of equal
brevity: p1 = p2 and equal violence, either measured as equal steepness μ1 = μ2 or equal





The results are in table 11. The estimates of the probability of remaining in a con-
traction or an expansion are quite high, reﬂecting the persistence of business cycle phases.
Moreover, they tend to be close to each other. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that contractions are as long as expansions for both output and employment. As for
violence, for output, at the 5% signiﬁcance level, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal
steepness but reject equal sharpness. For employment, we reject equal violence for both
measures of violence at the 5% level.
[...TABLE 11...]
6I m p l i c a t i o n s o f o u r ﬁndings for existing theories
There are a few models that generate asymmetric business cycles. In this section, we ask
whether they can account for our ﬁnding that there is one precise form of asymmetry
between expansions and contractions in employment that is not present in output cycles.
Credit constraints are a source of asymmetry in Kocherlakota (2000). Large negative
shocks can lead to large cuts in production since agents cannot borrow, whilst positive
shocks are attenuated using savings. While credit constraints explain the diﬀerent reaction
to positive and negative shocks, they do not account for the diﬀerence between expan-
sions and contractions. Moreover, credit constraints should aﬀect both output and employ-
ment equally. The same problem arises with theories that emphasize capacity constraints.
Gilchrist and Williams (2000) and Hansen and Prescott (2005) argue that during booms
expanding production requires expending resources to set up more plants. In recessions
21instead, some plants are not used and can be re-activated or de-activated at no cost. This
model generates asymmetries in both output and employment.
Jovanovic (2006) proposes a model in which ﬁrms must adopt technologies without
knowing whether they are a good ﬁt for their production process. As bad ﬁts lower output
by more than good ﬁts raises it, output is negatively skewed. While skewness is an important
feature of the data, it is conceptually distinct from brevity and violence of expansions and
contractions. Caballero and Hammour (1996) analyze an economy in which ﬁrms at each
date face the option of paying a cost to scrap their old technology and adopt a new one. With
technological progress, they show that this creative destruction should be bunched around
recessions, when the marginal proﬁtability of production is lower. If new technologies are
embodied in jobs, then there will be a sharp increase in unemployment around recessions.
This model generates violent and short-lived contractions in employment. However, in their
model, output follows the same dynamics as employment.
Increasing returns to scale can be another source of asymmetry. Acemoglu and Scott
(1997) argue that investment in maintenance today not only raises productivity today but
also lowers the cost of adopting new technologies tomorrow. Past shocks therefore aﬀect the
proﬁtability of current investments and thus the economy’s response to shocks. While their
model is ﬂexible enough to account for diﬀerent types of asymmetries between prolonged ex-
pansions and prolonged contractions, it emphasizes investment as the source of asymmetries
and output as its reﬂection. Our ﬁndings emphasize that the key is employment.
Chalkley and Lee (1998) and Veldkamp and van Nieuwerburgh (2006) argue that when
output is high, investors face less uncertainty. Around peaks, they therefore respond to bad
shocks quickly, leading to violent contractions, at least initially. Around troughs, there is
less precision of information so the response to positive shocks is slow. These theories can
account for diﬀerences in violence. However, they lead to a diﬀerence between contractions
and expansions in output and investment, but not necessarily in employment. Moreover,
they do not generate asymmetries in brevity.
From the perspective of the labor market, Burgess (1992) argues that the cost of ad-
justing employment for a ﬁrm depend on the tightness of the labor market. In booms, the
labor market is tight and employment moves slowly, whereas in slumps, the market is slack,
and employment moves quickly. Our ﬁnding however was that expansions were diﬀerent
from contractions, rather than booms diﬀerent than slumps. In the model of Burgess, the
22initial stage of contractions would be more violent than its later stages (and the reverse for
expansions), but on average, expansions and contractions would be equally violent.
The model of job creation and job destruction of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) can
generate diﬀerent violence during expansions and contractions. In their model, job destruc-
tion occurs immediately once the value to the ﬁrm and the worker of being matched is
negative. Job creation on the other hand takes place only with some probability. Thus, em-
ployment can fall quickly and violently, but it must expand slowly. However, output equals
employment so it is asymmetric as well. Moreover, expansions are as brief as contractions.
Overall, we conclude that none of the existing theories can account for all of: (1) sym-
metric expansions and contractions in output, (2) briefer and more violent contractions
than expansions in employment and (3) employment lagging output at peaks but not at
troughs. Next, we ask whether some of the features in these models can be combined to
match all three facts.
7T h r e e i n g r e d i e n t s t o ﬁtt h ef a c t s
In this section, we build a simple stylized model of the business cycle. Using the economic
mechanisms in the previous section, our aim is to ﬁnd what combination of ingredients is
required to generate the three ﬁndings describing the business cycle dynamics in ﬁgure 3.
7.1 Setup of the model
The structure of the model is standard. Time is continuous and there are two types of agents:
households and ﬁr m s .T h e r ei sau n i tm a s so fi n ﬁnitely-lived households that discount the
future at rate r a n do b t a i naﬂow of utility that is linear in consumption (ci,t) and hours
worked (hi,t). The assumption of linear utility implies that the interest rates is always r and





e−rt(ci,t − mhi,t)dt, (1)
s.t. : dbi,t/dt = ωi,t + πtki,t − κki,t − ci,t + rbi,t. (2)
23In the budget constraint, assets (bi,t) increase by the wage received by this household (ωi,t)
and by the returns from renting capital (ki,t)a tp r i c eπt in the market. Every instant, the
agent incurs a cost κ associated with maintaining and repairing the capital stock when it is
being employed by ﬁrms in the use of a speciﬁc technology. Agents can trade bonds with
each other that on aggregate are in zero net supply (
R 1
0 bi,tdi =0at all t) ,a n dt h e yo w n
capital that on aggregate is in ﬁxed one unit supply (
R 1
0 ki,tdi =1at all t).




There is free access to this technology, which combined with constant returns to scale implies
perfect competition. Capital is rented from households every period in a competitive market.
When a ﬁrm hires each worker, they set the hours of work and the wage. To preserve zero
proﬁts by ﬁrms in equilibrium, we assume that the worker captures the entire surplus from
the relationship. This assumption is not essential–the combination of perfect competition
by ﬁrms and linear utility function of workers implies that any other rule to divide the
surplus leads to the same aggregate equilibrium.
The ﬁrst non-standard feature of the model is that total labor equals the integral of the
product of diﬀerent tasks that each occupy one worker. The ﬁr s tu n i to fl a b o rs p e n ta ta




At(Aiqi,t + li,t)dF(Ai,T), (4)
with 0 ≤ qi,t ≤ 1, li,t ≥ 0,a n dhi,t = qi,t + li,t for all i. These assumptions capture the
presence of diminishing returns to work eﬀo r ta sw e l la st h eb e n e ﬁts of specialization, since
they imply that the ﬁrst hours of a skilled worker at her speciﬁc task are more productive
than her overtime. Specialization also entails costs in that operating each task requires
using a ﬁxed z units of labor to cover the accounting and administrative work of managing
each job.15 This cost is positive but not so large that in equilibrium no worker is hired.
The ﬁrm’s problem is then to choose every instant how many workers to have (N) and how
m a n yh o u r so fw o r ki ne a c ht a s k( qi and li) so as to maximize proﬁts Yt −
R
ωi,tdi − πtKt.
15While our model does not have a government, these could also be interpreted as including the pecuniary
costs of buying worker’s insurance or minimum social security contributions.
24The second key feature of our model is the distinction between the general productivity
in the economy (A) and the technology that is available (T). The productivity of each task
Ai is distributed according to F(Ai,T) with support [1,T] and positive mass everywhere.
Our only assumption on this distribution is that the higher is the top technology available,
the more productive is the technology on average if its top tasks are being used. (Formally,




x AidF(Ai,T0) for all x.) A higher T therefore unam-
biguously implies a better technology. Both productivity and technology are stochastic and
vary over the business cycle. We make the simplest possible assumption on their dynamics:
productivity growth (de-trended) can take on two values, g during expansions and −g dur-
ing contractions, while technology alternates between TE during expansions and TC <TE
during contractions. The economy switches between expansions and contractions according
to a Poisson process with arrival rate λ.
The competitive equilibrium in this economy is an allocation of output, consumption,
jobs, and hours worked, such that households maximize utility and ﬁrms maximize proﬁts,
the market where ﬁrms sell their goods to households clears, the labor market where ﬁrms
hire workers clears, and the bonds and capital markets clear. The equilibrium is eﬃcient
and solves a social planner problem.
7.2 First ingredient: hours and workers
To ﬁto u rﬁndings, it must be possible that sometimes output contracts and employment
expands, while at other times output and employment move in the same direction but at
diﬀerent speed. If ﬁrms can vary the number of hours and output by each worker, as in
theories of labor hoarding, this is possible.16 This is possible in the model above since ﬁrms
can either hire more workers or increase the overtime hours of existing workers.
The equilibrium level of employment is determined by ﬁrms trading oﬀ the specialization
beneﬁts of a task with its administrative costs. Firms optimally follow a threshold rule: if
a task has a productivity Ai above or equal to a threshold x,i ti so p e r a t e d ;o t h e r w i s e ,i ti s
not. The optimal threshold x∗ is equal to 1+z. Because of the administrative costs, not all
possible jobs are ﬁlled–rather than ﬁll the worst available job at cost z with productivity
16However, note that the standard model of labor hoarding and capacity utilization cannot produce these
results. If ﬁrms choose the intensity at which to use their workers and if increasing inensity raises the
marginal beneﬁt of hiring the extra worker, then employment, eﬀort, and output all move in the same
direction.
25A,aﬁrm would prefer to increase the overtime in the other jobs at no ﬁxed cost but with
the same marginal productivity. The number of jobs is then N =1− F(x,T).
As for the equilibrium level of hours, note that s i n c eo v e r t i m ei se q u a l ly productive across
all tasks, li is the same for all i. In equilibrium the marginal product of an extra hour of
work equals its marginal disutility b, so total overtime hours are: Nl =[ αAα/b]
1/(1−α) −
R T
x AidF(Ai,T). Since in equilibrium K =1 , total output is Y =[ αAα/b]
α/(1−α).
It is now clear how, by allowing for labor hoarding, our simple model is able to separate
ﬂuctuations in output and employment. If productivity A changes, output will change but
employment will not. Changes in output are made possible by changes in overtime hours,
without the need for any change in the number of jobs. Changes in employment are instead
driven by changes in the distribution of skills, which we modelled through changes in the
top technology T.W h e n T rises, a higher number of tasks have productivity above the
threshold x so employment rises.
Figure 8 illustrates the peak-to-peak dynamics of this economy. With just this ingredi-
ent, both output and employment are still symmetric with respect to brevity and violence.
[...FIGURE 8...]
7.3 Second ingredient: choosing technology adoption
Inspired by the theories of creative destruction, we give ﬁrms the freedom to choose when
to shift technologies. To this end, we now assume that when a turning point arrives, the
old technology remains available, but the cost of operating an obsolete technology is κe¯ κτ,
growing exponentially at the rate ¯ κ with the time elapsed since the turning point τ.F i r m s
can therefore choose whether to stay with the old technology and pay a higher rent on
capital to cover the higher maintenance costs, or switch to the new technology for which
maintenance costs are a constant κ.17
Social welfare depends on productivity A, the number of workers N, the technology used
S ∈ {E,C},a n dt h et i m eτ that an old technology has been in use since a new technology
17While inspired by theories of technology adoption and creative destruction, our setup is diﬀerent from
the typical models in this literature. In those models, technological changes also lead to changes in aggregate
productivity (A) and labor costs (z). In our setup, these would lead to asymmetries in output and equal






AidF(Ai,TS) − N(1 + z)
!
− κe¯ κτ. (5)
The ﬁrst term gives the utility from consuming output, while the second term is the surplus
that is generated from the ability to work with a marginal product Ai at an opportunity
cost b. The third term is the cost of maintaining the capital being used with the current
technology. Note that if the TE technology is being used during an expansion or the TC
technology during a contraction, then τ =0 , whereas otherwise τ is the time elapsed since
the last turning point.
Consider now the problem facing the economy when a trough arrives. It can either
stay with the old technology with beneﬁt W(A,NC,C,τ) from then on, or switch to
the new technology, adjust its workforce, and earn W(A,NE,E,0). From equation (5),
W(A,NE,E,0) >W(A,NC,C,τ) for all τ so the economy switches to the new technology
immediately in troughs. Consider next what happens when a peak arrives. In the ﬁrst in-
s t a n ta f t e rt h ep e a k ,W(A,NE,E,0) >W(A,NC,C,0), so the economy stays with the old
technology. As time elapses though, W(A,NE,E,τ) − W(A,NC,C,0) falls monotonically
with τ until the time τ∗ arrives when it equals zero. At this point, ﬁrms adopt the new
technology.
The business cycle dynamics are in ﬁgure 9. When a peak arrives, now ﬁrms choose to
stay with the old technology. In the instant after the shock, the old technology produces
on average more than the new technology and the maintenance costs are still the same. As
time progresses though, the old technology becomes increasingly more costly to operate.
At some point, ﬁrms switch to the new technology and employment falls. When the trough
arrives, ﬁrms switch to the new technology immediately: it is more productive and has
initially the same cost of operation. The model now generates brevity in employment.
[...FIGURE 9...]
7.4 Third ingredient: Job destructions are immediate but job creation
takes time
There are two alternative ways to formalize this ingredient, one taking the perspective of
the ﬁrm, and another the perspective of the worker. We present each separately.
27The ﬁrm’s perspective: costs of training. The new assumption is that ﬁrms can no longer
costlessly and instantaneously adjust the number of workers N. Instead the total number
of jobs evolves over time according to
dN/dt = H − F − δN, (6)
where H ≥ 0 are hires, F ≥ 0 are ﬁres, and δ is a rate of exogenous separations. The
key assumption is that there are asymmetric adjustment costs of hiring and ﬁring workers.
Firing is costly, but the marginal cost per worker is constant at β labor hours. Hiring
new workers instead involves training them, and training is subject to decreasing returns to
scale.18 To hire H workers requires using labor according to the training function l
γ
T,w i t h
γ<1. The adjustment costs therefore are:
C(F,H)=bβF + bH1/γ (7)
To solve for the new equilibrium, we use a recursive representation of social welfare.
Let V (.) denote the value function when productivity is A,e m p l o y m e n ti sN,t h es t a t eo f
technology is S, and an old technology has been used for τ periods. Then:
rV(A,N,S,τ)=m a x
F,H
[W(A,N,S,τ) − C(F,H)+E(dV )/dt], (8)
subject to (5), (6), (7) and dA/dt = ±g.U s i n gI t o ’ sl e m m a :
E(dV )/dt = ±gVA(N,S,τ)+VN(N,S,τ)(H − F − δN)+λ
¡




where ¯ S is the element of {E,C} that is not S. The second term captures the change in
value from the switch of technology follo w i n gt h ea r r i v a lo fat u r n i n gp o i n t .
The characterization of the equilibrium is lengthy so we relegate it to the appendix, and
describe its main features here. At any state of the business cycle, the economy can be in
three regions. If employment is above ¯ NS, then there is an immediate burst of ﬁring driving
18This asymmetry between the cost of increasing and reducing employment is supported by the evidence
surveyed in Hamermesh and Pfann (1996). There is also strong empirical evidence for ﬁxed adjustment costs,
which we do not include in the model. The empirical studies so far have not looked for any asymmetry in
ﬁxed costs between increasing and reducing employment.
28employment down to ¯ NS. Since there are constant returns to ﬁring, all of it takes place at
once. If employment is in the range between a lower threshold NS and ¯ NS it is optimal
to have neither ﬁring nor hiring. Employment in this range falls at rate δ as separations
occur voluntarily at no cost for ﬁrms. In the third and ﬁnal range (below NS), there is
positive hiring. If employment is above ˆ NS, then hiring is lower than voluntary separations;
if it is below, hiring exceeds voluntary separations. At ˆ NS, hiring equals separations and
employment is in a steady state.
Figure 10 plots the business cycle dynamics starting from a peak at which the economy
is in a steady state, and assuming that TE is suﬃciently higher than TC,s ot h a t ¯ NC < ˆ NE.
When the peak arrives, the economy maintains the old technology until it is too costly to
do so. When that happens, there is a switch to the contraction technology and ﬁrms want
to lay oﬀ workers. Because the marginal cost of layoﬀs is constant, they do all the ﬁring at
once. They do not ﬁre all the way to the new steady state, however, as the ﬁrm can use
the exogenous separations (which are costless) to deplete the stock of remaining workers.
As a result, employment ﬁrst falls sharply, as ﬁring is bunched, and then contracts at the
rate δ for a while. After that, ﬁrms start hiring to ensure that employment does not fall so
much that repleting the stock of workers during an expansion is very costly. Employment
keeps on falling but now at a declining rate towards its new steady state. When a trough
arrives, the new technology is immediately adopted. Firms want to hire more workers
but face increasing marginal costs of doing so. They therefore choose to hire gradually so
employment slowly rises. Contractions in employment are more violent than expansions.
[...FIGURE 10...]
The worker’s perspective: job search. An alternative setup that leads to similar dynamics
assumes that workers can quit their jobs instantly, but only ﬁn dan e wj o bw i t hs o m e
probability, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In this model, ﬁrms face only one
decision: whether to open a vacancy or not. It is costless to open a vacancy and all ﬁrms
are identical so, as long as the marginal product of an extra worker is positive, then all ﬁrms
post vacancies. Otherwise, no ﬁrm posts a vacancy. In our model, the marginal product
of having an extra worker is b(x − 1 − z), which falls with employment and is higher if a
superior technology is in use.
29Workers currently employed can remain in their job or quit, while those unemployed
can search for a job or not. Letting J(S) denote the value of having a job in state S,a n d
U(S) the value of being unemployed, the Bellman equation for employed workers is:
rJ(S)=m a x
©
b(x − 1 − z)+δ(U(S) − J(S)) + λ(J(¯ S) − J(S));rU(S)
ª
, (10)
where the second option is to quit. The value of being unemployed is:
rU(S)=m a x
©
−η + π(S)(J(S) − U(S)) + λ(U(¯ S) − U(S));0
ª
, (11)
where η is a search cost and π(S) is the probability of ﬁnding a job.19 This probability comes
from a Cobb-Douglas matching function so that π(S)=( vacancies/searchers)1−θ,i n c r e a s i n g
at a declining rate on the ratio of vacancies to job-searchers. Employment evolves according:
dN/dt = −δN + π(S)searchers − quits. (12)
The detailed solution of this model is in the appendix. As in the case of adjustment
costs to the ﬁrm, there are three relevant regions. If employment is above ¯ MS,t h em a r g i n a l
product of a job is negative, and workers quit their jobs. Employment falls abruptly up to
the point where the marginal product of the extra job is zero. If employment is between
MS and ¯ MS, workers stay in their job, but the unemployed are indiﬀerent as to whether
to search for a job or not. Only a few search (or all follow a mixed strategy searching with
some probability), since the probability of ﬁnding a job is high but the return to having
a job is small. Employment falls as long as the rate δ at which voluntary separations
take place is suﬃciently high.20 Finally, below MS,a l lo ft h eu n e m p l o y e ds e a r c hf o ra
job. If employment is above ˆ MS, there are few vacancies so the job-ﬁnding rate is smaller
than the job separation rate and employment falls; below ˆ MS there is more job-hiring
and employment rises; and at ˆ MS employment is in a steady state. As before, we assume
19Note that, unlike before, the assumption that workers collect the entire surplus from a match plays an
important role here. Since only workers pay costs of searching, it ensures that the equilibrium is still Pareto
eﬃcient. This allows us to abstract from the details of the bargaining process (Mortensen and Pissarides,
1994) or appropriability problems (Caballero and Hammour, 1996).
20We focus on this case, but if δ is low, the qualitative dynamics of employment during the cycle are the
same. In this case, the steady state level of employment ˆ M
S >M
S, and the economy converges to it slowly
j u s ta si nt h ec a s et h a tw ef o c u so n .
30that technology during expansions is suﬃciently better than technology during contractions
which ensures ˆ ME > ¯ MC.
The qualitative dynamics of this economy are just like in ﬁgure 10. Now, when the switch
to the contraction technology occurs, a set of jobs have negative surplus. Workers quit these
immediately, and employment falls abruptly. Afterwards, only a few of the unemployed
search for a job. This is not enough to compensate for the exogenous separations, so
employment falls rapidly up to the point where all unemployed start searching for jobs.
Employment from then on declines at a decreasing speed towards a steady state. When
the trough arrives, there is an immediate switch to the new technology, and employment
starts rising at a declining speed. Now, contractions in employment are more violent than
expansions because quitting occurs instantly, whereas ﬁnding a job takes time.
7.5 Alternative ingredients
The end result of combining the three ingredients are the business cycle dynamics in ﬁgure
10. It ﬁts the three results that we found robustly characterize the U.S. post-war data. Our
model is simple and has some special assumptions, but we see these as virtues. They allow
us to point precisely to the ingredients that are needed to qualitatively ﬁtt h ef a c t s ,a n d
can therefore serve to guide future theories.
There are certainly alternatives to the ingredients that we have used. For instance,
instead of being able to vary hours instead of the number of workers to aﬀect production,
it is possible that ﬁrms can vary capital utilization (Greenwood et al, 1998), organizational
capital (van Rens, 2004), or organizational restructuring (Koenders and Rogerson, 2005).
As an alternative to the delayed technology adoption in our second ingredient, perhaps ﬁrms
instead switch between modes of governance (Philippon, 2005) or face uncertainty on future
productivity that combined with ﬁxed costs of switching creates an option value of waiting.
Finally, as an alternative to our third ingredient, maybe newly formed ﬁrm-worker matches
face uncertainty on their joint productivity and learn about it gradually, in which case, a
sudden contraction in employment creates a steady ﬂow of short-term jobs and recurring
job losses while good matches are found leading to tame expansions in employment (Pries,
2004).
None of the papers described in the previous paragraph is able to explain our empirical
ﬁndings. But the simple model in this section points to the directions in which the economic
31mechanisms that they suggest would have to be modiﬁed to explain the business cycle fact
on brevity and violence. Once alternative theories are formulated, we can then use micro-
level data to distinguish between them. We are currently undertaking this research.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigated the claim that business contractions are briefer and more violent
than business expansions. We examined diﬀerent series for business activity, diﬀerent mea-
sures of expansions and contractions, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of brevity and violence, and dif-
ferent approaches to statistically infer whether there is a diﬀerence. The robust conclusion
was that contractions in output are as brief and violent as expansions, but contractions in
employment are briefer and more violent than expansions. Typically employment peaks a
few quarters before output, while the troughs in both series are roughly coincident.
While some existing theories on asymmetric business cycles oﬀer clues on how to explain
this fact, none can fully account for it. To ﬁt our empirical ﬁndings, one needs a theory that
allows for output and employment to follow diﬀerent dynamics, for employment to remain
high as output is falling, and for employment to fall abruptly but rise steadily. We built
a model that can qualitatively account for the ﬁndings by combining labor hoarding, the
ability to choose when to scrap old technologies, and the diﬃculty of creating jobs relative
to destroying them. Future work can take our theoretical results in one of two directions.
Either it can reﬁne the assumptions in the model to the point where it can be used to
quantitatively match the facts as well, or it can explore how to use alternative ingredients
to generate the same set of facts.
The results in this paper inform two current debates. The ﬁrst is on the persistence
of high unemployment in Europe. After rising abruptly in a few years in the 1980s, un-
employment in many European countries has remained stubbornly high. This paper has
found that brief and sharp increases in unemployment followed by protracted reductions
are a robust feature of the U.S. economy as well. The diﬀerence between Europe and the
U.S. is of the magnitude in the pace of decrease in unemployment.
The second debate is on jobless recoveries in the U.S. We have found that on average,
in the post-war, troughs in employment and output have coincided so jobless recoveries
are not the norm. However, we have also found that starting from a trough, employment
32expands at a slow pace in the beginning of a recovery. This may lead to an impression of
joblessness at the start of a recovery. The decline in volatility in the last 20 years may have
made recoveries even tamer. Whether the properties of the business cycle have changed can
only be resolved with the accumulation of time and data.
339A p p e n d i x
9.1 Turning point algorithms
Window method: For a given series, {xt}
T
t=1, the window method with window size w begins







are tentatively labeled as troughs. A similar operation yields a set of tentative peaks. The
method then imposes the requirement that peaks and troughs alternate. This is achieved
by retaining the latest of a series of successive turning points of the same type. We found
that the window method was sensitive to noise and therefore pre-smoothed the data using
a ﬁve-quarter, centered moving average.
Reversal method: The reversal method requires two parameters representing the “rever-
sal pattern” that identiﬁes a turning point. A (3,2) r e v e r s a l( t h eo n ew eu s e )i d e n t i ﬁes a
peak as an episode in which the series rises for three successive quarters and then imme-
diately falls for two successive quarters. Once a tentative set of turning points has been
identiﬁed, the requirement that turning points alternate is imposed in the same manner as
in the window method.
Bry-Boschan: The Bry-Boschan procedure is described by Bry and Boschan (1971) and
King and Plosser (1994). It was originally developed for monthly data and we adapt it to
quarterly data in the same manner as King and Plosser: the quarterly value is repeated for
each month of the quarter. Our procedure diﬀers from that described by King and Plosser
in that we use a 10 month moving average in the ﬁrst step and a 6 month moving average
in the third. We use the programs made available by Monch and Uhlig (2004).
Chauvet-Hamilton: Chauvet and Hamilton (2005) ﬁt a two-state Markov-switching
model to the ﬁrst diﬀerences of GDP in which each observation is drawn from normal dis-
tribution with a common variance and a mean that depends on the state. We expand their
m o d e lt oa l l o wt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h eﬁrst diﬀerences to change between states. As explained
in the text, we also allow the variance to change before and after 1984Q3. Contractions
are then deﬁned as periods in which the smoothed regime probability is greater than 0.5
for the state with the smaller mean ﬁrst diﬀerence. The remaining dates are classiﬁed as
expansions. The model is estimated by numerical maximum likelihood.
349.2 Solution of the training model




⎣ W(A,N,S,τ) − C(F,H)+VN(N,S,τ)(H − F − δN)
+λ
¡





subject to the constraints H ≥ 0,F ≥ 0, and dN/dt = H − F − δN.N o t e t h a t WAN(.)
and WNτ(.) are always zero and so VAN(.)=VNτ(.)=0 . The necessary conditions for
optimality are:
−bβ − VN(S) ≤ 0,F≥ 0,F (bβ + VN(S)) = 0 (14)





(r + δ)VN(S)=b(x − 1 − z)+VNN(S)(H − F − δN)+λ
¡
VN(¯ S) − VN(S)
¢
. (16)
To save on length, we report only the S argument of the value functions. The three condi-
tions in (14) are the ﬁrst-order condition for F, the constraint on ﬁres, and a complementary
slackness condition. The equivalent conditions for hires are in (15). The envelope theorem
condition with respect to employment is in (16), which used the fact that N =1−f(x)/T.
Note that it is never optimal to have positive hires and ﬁr e s .A n yp o l i c yt h a ti n v o l v e st h i s
is dominated by a policy that leads to the same net change in employment at a lower cost by
lowering either hires or ﬁres to zero. There are therefore three optimal regions: when there is
ﬁring, when there is hiring, and when there is neither. If ﬁring is positive, then (14) implies
that VN(S)=−bβ. If hiring is positive, then (15) implies that VN(S)=( b/γ)H1/γ−1.
When there is neither ﬁring nor hiring, (16) implies that VN(S) falls monotonically with N
from 0 to −bβ.B e c a u s eV (S) is concave, VN(S) must weakly fall with N so: for N above
¯ NS,t h e r ei sﬁring and VN(S)=−bβ;f o rN between NS and ¯ NS, VN(S) rises as N falls
through voluntary separations equalling 0 at NS;a n db e l o wNS VN(S)=( b/γ)H1/γ−1 and
there are positive hires.
Next we characterize the equilibrium values of these thresholds, and the dynamics of
employment. We focus on the equilibrium in which ¯ NC < ˆ NE–we will later ﬁnd the
condition on parameters for this to hold. If N>¯ NE, then there is ﬁring in both states.
35Condition (16) during expansions implies that
¯ NE =1− f(1 + z − β(r + δ))/TE, (17)
the number of ﬁres F = N − ¯ NE, as the economy jumps to the threshold immediately.
When NE <N< ¯ NE, F = H =0 ,a n ddN/dt = −δN.T o ﬁnd NE, since at this point
VN(S)=0 , (16) implies that:
NE =1− f(1 + z + βλ)/TE. (18)
Note that employment is lower than the value for which x =1+z as long as λ 6=0because
the possibility of a technological change leads ﬁrms to hold back on the number of workers to
lower future costs of ﬁring. Finally, below NE, taking time derivatives of (15) to substitute
for VNN in (16), one ﬁnds the dynamic system:
dH
dt








in the variables x and H. The unique steady state of this system is ˆ HE = δ ˆ NE, ˆ NE =
1 − f(ˆ xE)/TE,a n dˆ xE solves the non-linear equation:




1 − f(ˆ xE)/TE¢¤1/γ−1
/γ (21)
Very similar steps give the contraction thresholds: ¯ NC, NC,a n d ˆ NC. The last thing to
check is that ¯ NC < ˆ NE. Condition (16) for S = C becomes, after rearranging:
¯ xC =1+z − β(r + δ) − (λ/b)[VN(E)+bβ]. (22)
Since VN(E) > −bβ, comparing (21) and (22), we see that ¯ xC < ˆ xE,a n ds of(¯ xC) <f(ˆ xE).
Now, ¯ NC < ˆ NE requires that f(¯ xC)/f(ˆ xE) >T C/TE. This will hold for sure as long as
TC/TE is small enough. Finally, note that our assumption that ¯ xS > 1 requires that TC
and TE are suﬃciently large. We can see this in (21) and (22).
369.3 Solution of the job-search model
Since, for any ﬁxed N, the marginal product of a jog is higher in expansions than contrac-
tions, it must be that J(E) ≥ J(C) and U(E) ≥ U(C). The choice of workers is whether
to quit or stay in their job, while the choice of the unemployed is whether to search for
jobs or not. Therefore, there are in principle 4 possible regions. However, since if there are
quits, J(S)=U(S) which implies U(S)=0 , no one searches. Therefore, there are only
three regions: when workers quits and no one searches for a job so J(S)=U(S)=0and
employment falls; when no one quits and the unemployed are indiﬀerent between looking
f o raj o bo rn o t ,s oJ(S) > 0=U(S) and employment may fall or rise depending on δ;a n d
when no one quits and everyone searches for a job so J(S) > 0 and U(S) > 0.S i n c et h e
value functions are concave in N, these correspond to three regions in employment: ( ¯ MS,1],
(MS, ¯ MS] and [0,MS], and if there is a steady state ˆ MS it must be in the last region.
A sb e f o r e ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r e ˆ ME > ¯ MC to lower the number of possible regions
for employment across the two states. Consider ﬁrst the region where N> ¯ ME and we are
in an expansion. Here, workers quit their job and employment falls abruptly to ¯ ME.T h e
threshold is at the point where the worker is indiﬀerent between quitting or staying. This
occurs when b(x − 1 − z)=0so:
¯ ME =1− f(1 + z)/T E (23)
Second, we look at the region where N ∈ (ME, ¯ ME]. Here, U(E)=0and J(E) > 0,s o
combining the two Bellman equations:
π(E)=
η(r + δ + λ)
b(x − 1 − z)
. (24)
Now, ﬁrms post vacancies as long as their marginal product is positive, so ¯ ME−N vacancies
are posted. The equation above can then be solved for how many searchers look for a job:
searchers =(¯ ME − N)
∙
b(x − 1 − z)
η(r + δ + λ)
¸1/(1−θ)
, (25)
while the dynamics of employment are dN/dt = −δN + π(E)searchers. As stated in the
t e x t ,w ea s s u m et h a tδ is high enough that dN/dt < 0 as long as searchers< 1 −ME.T h i s






¯ ME − ME
¶1−θ




For N ∈ ( ¯ MC,ME), J(E) >U (E) > 0 so all workers stay in their jobs and all the
unemployed search for a job. The dynamics of employment are then dN/dt = −δN +( ¯ M −
N)1−θ(1−N)θ. Employment is clearly falling at a declining rate as long as N is above the
steady state ˆ ME, which is the solution of:
δ ˆ ME =
³
¯ ME − ˆ ME
´1−θ
(1 − ˆ ME)θ (27)
The solution for the thresholds during a contraction follows along the same lines.
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43Table 1a. Duration of output and employment, linearly de-trended with breaks 




Industrial Window  Expansions 11.273  1.072  1.18 
Production   Contractions 8.167  (0.142)  (0.130) 
 Reversal  Expansions  10.417  0.706  0.226 
   Contractions 8.250  (0.240)  (0.421) 
 Bry-Boschan  Expansions  11.364  1.220  0.681 
   Contractions 7.546  (0.111)  (0.260) 
 Expansions  24.800  0.973  2.121* 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 16.000  (0.165)  (0.041) 
Employment Window  Expansions 17.875  2.401**  1.99* 
Rate   Contractions 8.778 (0.008)  (0.037) 
 Reversal  Expansions  15.900  2.698**  2.357* 
   Contractions 6.600  (0.003)  (0.018) 
 Bry-Boschan  Expansions  18.375  2.754**  3.105** 
   Contractions 8.222  (0.003)  (0.006) 
 Expansions  15.222  1.505  1.208 
 
Regime-
Switching Contractions 9.222  (0.066)  (0.129) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from 
the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a Wilcoxon test of distributions with p-values 




Table 1b. Duration of output and employment, polynomially de-trended 




Industrial Window  Expansions 10.818  0.760  0.423 
Production   Contractions 8.583  (0.224)  (0.347) 
 Reversal  Expansions  10.583  0.774  0.511 
   Contractions 8.167  (0.219)  (0.315) 
 Bry-Boschan  Expansions  11.273  1.062  0.362 
   Contractions 8.000  (0.144)  (0.370) 
  Expansions  24.400 0.900 2.121* 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 16.333  (0.184)  (0.041) 
Employment Window  Expansions 17.625  2.318*  1.99* 
Rate   Contractions 9.000 (0.010)  (0.037) 
  Reversal Expansions  15.300 2.39** 2.041* 
   Contractions 7.200  (0.008)  (0.032) 
  Bry-Boschan  Expansions  18.000 2.633** 3.45** 
   Contractions 8.000  (0.004)  (0.003) 
 Expansions  15.111  1.435  1.016 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 9.444  (0.076)  (0.170) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from 
the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a Wilcoxon test of distributions with p-values 
from the exact finite sample distribution. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 Table 1c. Duration of output and employment, band-pass filter de-trended 




Industrial Window  Expansions 8.615  0.687  0.82 
Production   Contractions 7.714  (0.246)  (0.215) 
  Reversal  Expansions  6.579 1.308 1.531 
   Contractions 5.263  (0.096)  (0.069) 
 Bry-Boschan  Expansions  9.000  1.145  1.71 
   Contractions 7.357  (0.126)  (0.052) 
 Expansions  11.600  0.531  0.767 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 9.455  (0.298)  (0.234) 
Employment Window  Expansions 9.917  1.93*  2.023* 
Rate   Contractions 7.615 (0.027)  (0.030) 
  Reversal  Expansions  7.177 1.016 1.416 
   Contractions 6.059  (0.155)  (0.085) 
 Bry-Boschan  Expansions  10.417  2.616**  3.391** 
   Contractions 7.000  (0.004)  (0.002) 
 Expansions  13.111  1.025  1.243 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 9.800  (0.153)  (0.121) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from 
the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a Wilcoxon test of distributions with p-values 




Table 1d. Duration of output and employment, modified-HP filter de-trended 




Industrial Window  Expansions 11.273  1.072  1.18 
Production   Contractions 8.167  (0.142)  (0.130) 
  Reversal  Expansions  9.615 0.724 0.685 
   Contractions 7.615  (0.235)  (0.256) 
 Bry-Boschan  Expansions  10.000  1.083  0.627 
   Contractions 7.333  (0.139)  (0.276) 
  Expansions  25.000 1.023 2.121* 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 15.833  (0.153)  (0.041) 
Employment Window  Expansions 17.250  2.17*  1.736 
Rate   Contractions 9.333 (0.015)  (0.057) 
  Reversal Expansions  15.300 2.39** 2.041* 
   Contractions 7.200  (0.008)  (0.032) 
  Bry-Boschan  Expansions  18.000 2.633** 3.45** 
   Contractions 8.000  (0.004)  (0.003) 
 Expansions  15.222  1.491  1.016 
 
Regime-
switching Contractions 9.333  (0.068)  (0.170) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from 
the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a Wilcoxon test of distributions with p-
values from the exact finite sample distribution. * and ** denote significance at the 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
   
 
Table 2a. Violence of output and employment, linearly de-trended with breaks 















Industrial Production              
Window  Exp.  0.013 0.434  0.362 0.021 0.554  0.668 0.015  0.067  0 
  Cont.  -0.015  (0.332) (0.370) 0.024 (0.290) (0.263)  -0.015  (0.473)  (0.500) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.010  0.88  0.802 0.020 0.695  0.802 0.012  0.018 0.113 
  Cont.  -0.013  (0.189) (0.221) 0.023 (0.244) (0.221)  -0.012  (0.493)  (0.466) 
Bry- Exp.  0.013 0.191  0.289 0.022 0.479  0.681 0.016  0.401  0.16 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.014  (0.424) (0.398) 0.025 (0.316) (0.260)  -0.014  (0.344)  (0.449) 
Exp.  0.007 1.624  1.326 0.014  2.105* 2.121*  0.007  1.381 1.326  Regime-
switching  Cont. -0.0155  (0.052) (0.123) 0.027 (0.018) (0.041) -0.016  (0.084)  (0.123) 
Employment Rate              
Window  Exp.  0.002 2.258* 2.739* 0.004 2.244* 2.267* 0.002  1.977*  2.126* 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.012) (0.010) 0.006 (0.012) (0.023)  -0.004  (0.024)  (0.030) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.001 4.028** 4.086** 0.004 2.671** 2.961** 0.002  3.562**  3.896** 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.000) (0.001) 0.006 (0.004) (0.006)  -0.004  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Bry-  Exp.  0.002 3.208** 4.335** 0.004  2.103*  1.99*  0.002  2.901**  3.309** 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.004  (0.001) (0.001) 0.006 (0.018) (0.037)  -0.004  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Exp.  0.001 2.638**  1.726  0.002 5.439** 6.971** 0.001  2.798**  2.200*  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.003  (0.004)  (0.057)  0.006 (0.000) (0.000) -0.003  (0.003)  (0.025) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a 




Table 2b. Violence of output and employment, polynomial de-trended 















Industrial Production              
Window  Exp.  0.013 0.431  0.423 0.022 0.526  0.545 0.015 0.06  0.241 
  Cont.  -0.015  (0.333) (0.347) 0.024 (0.299) (0.304)  -0.015  (0.476)  (0.416) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.010 1.318  1.226 0.021 0.735  0.743 0.011  0.674 0.454 
  Cont.  -0.014  (0.094) (0.121) 0.024 (0.231) (0.239)  -0.013  (0.250)  (0.335) 
Bry- Exp.  0.013 0.404  0.731 0.022 0.372  0.362 0.015  0.167  0.12 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.014  (0.343) (0.243) 0.024 (0.355) (0.370)  -0.015  (0.434)  (0.464) 
Exp.  0.007 1.707* 2.121* 0.014 2.279* 2.882* 0.008 1.431  1.562  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.016  (0.044)  (0.041)  0.026 (0.011) (0.015) -0.016  (0.076)  (0.089) 
Employment Rate              
Window  Exp.  0.002  2.358** 2.739* 0.004 2.289* 2.267* 0.002  2.081*  2.739* 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.009) (0.010) 0.006 (0.011) (0.023)  -0.004  (0.019)  (0.010) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.001 3.765** 3.24**  0.004 2.603** 2.961** 0.002  3.325**  3.391** 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.000) (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) (0.006)  -0.004  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Bry-  Exp.  0.002 3.44** 3.72** 0.004  2.401** 2.592* 0.002  3.055**  3.45** 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.004  (0.000) (0.002) 0.006 (0.008) (0.014)  -0.004  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Exp.  0.001 2.508**  1.511  0.002  5.42** 6.971** 0.001  2.616**  1.838*  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.003  (0.006)  (0.081)  0.006 (0.000) (0.000) -0.003  (0.004)  (0.047) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a 




Table 2c. Violence of output and employment, band-pass filter de-trended 















Industrial Production              
Window  Exp.  0.011 0.483  0.623 0.015 0.593  0.575 0.013  0.295 0.334 
  Cont.  -0.013  (0.315) (0.275) 0.018 (0.277) (0.291)  -0.014  (0.384)  (0.378) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.009 0.899  0.71  0.013  0.81  0.858 0.010  0.788  0.74 
  Cont.  -0.011  (0.184) (0.244) 0.016 (0.209) (0.201)  -0.012  (0.215)  (0.235) 
Bry- Exp.  0.011  0.89  0.721 0.015 0.704  0.721 0.012  0.698 0.672 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.014  (0.187) (0.244) 0.018 (0.241) (0.244)  -0.015  (0.243)  (0.259) 
Exp.  0.004 1.631  1.527 0.008  2.266* 2.047*  0.004  1.479 1.367  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.009  (0.051)  (0.076)  0.017 (0.012) (0.031) -0.009  (0.070)  (0.099) 
Employment Rate              
Window  Exp.  0.002  0.77  0.866 0.003 0.847  0.978 0.002  0.672 0.755 
  Cont.  -0.003  (0.221) (0.203) 0.004 (0.198) (0.174)  -0.003  (0.251)  (0.235) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.002 0.773  0.528 0.003 0.841  0.946 0.002  0.736 0.528 
  Cont.  -0.002  (0.220) (0.305) 0.003 (0.200) (0.179)  -0.003  (0.231)  (0.305) 
Bry- Exp.  0.002  1.36  1.092 0.003 1.054  1.092 0.002  1.239 1.035 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.003  (0.087) (0.147) 0.004 (0.146) (0.147)  -0.003  (0.108)  (0.160) 
Exp.  0.001  1.263  .979  0.002 2.846** 2.773** 0.001 1.832*  1.719  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.002  (0.103)  (0.178)  0.004 (0.002) (0.009) -0.002  (0.033)  (0.056) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a 




Table 2d. Violence of output and employment, modified-HP filter de-trended 















Industrial Production              
Window  Exp.  0.014 0.268  0.241 0.022 0.484  0.668 0.016  0.201 0.181 
  Cont.  -0.015  (0.394) (0.416) 0.024 (0.314) (0.263)  -0.015  (0.420)  (0.440) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.011 0.616  0.378 0.020  0.39  0.429 0.013  0.238 0.378 
  Cont.  -0.012  (0.269) (0.362) 0.022 (0.348) (0.343)  -0.012  (0.406)  (0.362) 
Bry- Exp.  0.012  0.04  0.056 0.021 0.309  0.397 0.015  0.522  0.17 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.012  (0.484) (0.489) 0.023 (0.379) (0.356)  -0.013  (0.301)  (0.444) 
Exp.  0.006 1.767* 2.121* 0.014  2.362** 2.882* 0.007 1.394  1.326  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.016  (0.039)  (0.041)  0.027 (0.009) (0.015) -0.016  (0.082)  (0.123) 
Employment Rate              
Window  Exp.  0.002 2.079* 2.416* 0.004 2.158* 2.126* 0.003  1.847*  2.126* 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.019) (0.018) 0.006 (0.015) (0.030)  -0.004  (0.032)  (0.030) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.001 3.751** 3.549** 0.004 2.543** 2.961** 0.002  3.266**  3.24** 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.000) (0.002) 0.006 (0.006) (0.006)  -0.004  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Bry-  Exp.  0.002 3.406** 4.365** 0.004 2.343** 2.093*  0.002  3.001**  3.45** 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.004  (0.000) (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) (0.032)  -0.004  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Exp.  0.001 2.860** 2.200*  0.002 5.375** 6.971** 0.001  2.914**  2.200*  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.003  (0.002)  (0.025)  0.006 (0.000) (0.000) -0.003  (0.002)  (0.025) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a 




Table 2e. Violence of output and employment, band-pass (2,80) filter de-trended 















Industrial Production              
Window  Exp.  0.014 0.024  0.06  0.022 0.358  0.484 0.016  -0.364  -0.301 
  Cont.  -0.014  (0.491) (0.488) 0.023 (0.360) (0.325)  -0.014  (0.358)  (0.393) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.011 0.553  0.226 0.021 0.265  0.327 0.013  -0.313  -0.327 
  Cont.  -0.012  (0.290) (0.420) 0.022 (0.396) (0.381)  -0.012  (0.377)  (0.381) 
Bry- Exp.  0.014 -0.147  0.000 0.023 0.202  0.423 0.017  -0.634  -0.241 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.013  (0.441) (0.500) 0.024 (0.420) (0.347)  -0.014  (0.263)  (0.416) 
Exp.  0.009 0.050  -0.564 0.014 1.102  0.681 0.010  0.044 -0.223  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.010  (0.480)  (0.306)  0.020 (0.135) (0.268) -0.011  (0.483)  (0.433) 
Employment Rate              
Window  Exp.  0.002 1.508  1.427 0.004  1.838*  1.62  0.003  1.356 1.243 
  Cont.  -0.003  (0.066) (0.091) 0.005 (0.033) (0.067)  -0.004  (0.088)  (0.121) 
Reversal  Exp.  0.001 3.602** 3.717** 0.004 2.453** 2.705** 0.002  3.116**  2.83** 
  Cont.  -0.004  (0.000) (0.001) 0.006 (0.007) (0.009)  -0.004  (0.001)  (0.007) 
Bry-  Exp.  0.002 2.237* 2.263* 0.004  1.529  1.523  0.002  1.795* 1.719 
Boschan  Cont.  -0.003  (0.013) (0.022) 0.005 (0.063) (0.078)  -0.003  (0.036)  (0.056) 
Exp.  0.001 2.686**  2.33*  0.002 5.066** 5.829** 0.001  2.762**  2.200*  Regime-
switching Cont.  -0.002  (0.004)  (0.020)  0.006 (0.000) (0.000) -0.003  (0.003)  (0.025) 
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. t-statistics are for a test of means with p-values from the Normal distribution. W-statistics are for a 




   
Table 3. Duration and violence of output and employment, with monthly observations 








Average difference  -10.60  -0.009  0.003  -0.011 
  Fraction of rejections 









  Fraction of rejections 











Average difference  -22.71  -0.002  0.001  -0.002 
  Fraction of rejections 









  Fraction of rejections 









Notes: In each cell, the first row is based on the Wilcoxon test and the second on the test of means.  The time 
unit is one month. The averages and fractions are across the 16 combinations of methods of de-tending and 
detecting turning points. Differences are contractions less expansions. 
 
 Table 4. Duration and violence of output, using different series 








Average difference  -5.30 (-1.64)  -0.010 (-0.010)  0.002 (0.001)  -0.011 (-0.010) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
5/16 (1/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
4/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
4/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
1/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
4/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 




Average difference  -6.02 (-1.17)  -0.013 (-0.014)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.014 (-0.015) 
Output  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
4/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
4/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 




Average difference  -6.12 (-0.90)  -0.010 (-0.013)  0.003 (0.002)  -0.011 (-0.014) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
2/16 (0/12)    
2/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
1/16 (0/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
1/16 (0/12)    
2/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 




Average difference  -3.53 (-1.98)  -0.007 (-0.008)  0.002 (0.001)  -0.008 (-0.008) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (1/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
2/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 




Average difference  -16.20 (-1.45)  -0.006 (-0.007)  0.003 (0.001)  -0.007 (-0.008) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
1/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
1/16 (0/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 




Average difference  -1.19 (-0.65)  -0.039 (-0.047)  0.003 (-0.001)  -0.043 (-0.051) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
0/16 (0/12)    
1/16 (1/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
4/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
1/16 (0/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 




Average difference  21.03 (1.64)  -0.011 (-0.011) -0.005  (-0.002) -0.013  (-0.013) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
0/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
2/16 (1/12)    
4/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
3/16 (2/12)    
3/16 (1/12) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
0/16 (0/12)    
3/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
2/16 (0/12) 
0/16 (0/12)    
0/16 (0/12) 
1/16 (0/12)    
1/16 (0/12) 
Notes: In each cell, the first row is based on the Wilcoxon test and the second on the test of means.  The time 
unit is one month. The averages and fractions are across the 16 combinations of methods of de-tending and 
detecting turning points. Differences are contractions less expansions. In parentheses are the results excluding 
the use of the Chauvet-Hamilton algorithm. 
  
Table 5. Duration and violence of employment, using different series 








Average difference  -5.35 (-6.88)  -0.006 (-0.006)  0.002 (0.002)  -0.006 (-0.007) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
5/16 (6/16)    
4/16 (6/16) 
3/16 (4/16)    
3/16 (4/16) 
7/16 (8/16)    
9/16 (11/16) 
5/16 (5/16)    
4/16 (4/16) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
3/16 (4/16)    
3/16 (4/16) 
3/16 (4/16)    
3/16 (4/16) 
4/16 (5/16)    
5/16 (6/16) 




Average difference  -4.66 (-5.73)  -0.008 (-0.008)  0.002 (0.003)  -0.008 (-0.009) 
(Payroll)  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
5/16 (6/16)    
6/16 (8/16) 
8/16 (9/16)    
9/16 (11/16) 
5/16 (5/16)    
7/16 (8/16) 
4/16 (5/16)    
5/16 (7/16) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
0/16 (0/16)    
0/16 (0/16) 
1/16 (1/16)    
2/16 (2/16) 
1/16 (2/16)    
2/16 (3/16) 




Average difference  -3.74 (-3.75) 
 
-0.008 (-0.008)  0.002 (0.002)  -0.009 (-0.009) 
 
16 – 24 Yrs  Fraction of rejections 





2/16 (2/16)    
3/16 (3/16) 
1/16 (0/16)    
0/16 (0/16) 
  Fraction of rejections 





0/16 (0/16)    
0/16 (0/16) 




Average difference  -5.24 (-5.75) 
 
-0.004 (-0.005)  0.001 (0.002)  -0.005 (-0.005) 
 
Over 25 Yrs  Fraction of rejections 





6/16 (7/16)    
6/16 (7/16) 
5/16 (5/16)    
6/16 (7/16) 
  Fraction of rejections 





0/16 (0/16)    
1/16 (1/16) 




Average difference  2.51 (2.28)  -0.001 (-0.001)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.002 (-0.002) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
3/16 (2/16)    
4/16 (3/16) 
3/16 (3/16)    
3/16 (3/16) 
1/16 (1/16)    
2/16 (2/16) 
2/16 (1/16)    
2/16 (2/16) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
1/16 (0/16)    
1/16 (0/16) 
3/16 (3/16)    
2/16 (2/16) 
0/16 (0/16)    
1/16 (0/16) 




Average difference  -2.24 (-3.18)  -0.003 (-0.003)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.004 (-0.003) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 5% level 
3/16 (4/16)    
2/16 (3/16) 
3/16 (4/16)    
3/16 (4/16) 
0/16 (0/16)    
0/16 (0/16) 
3/16 (4/16)    
4/16 (6/16) 
  Fraction of rejections 
at 1% level 
2/16 (3/16)    
2/16 (3/16) 
2/16 (3/16)    
3/16 (4/16) 
0/16 (0/16)    
0/16 (0/16) 
2/16 (3/16)    
3/16 (4/16) 
Notes: In each cell, the first row is based on the Wilcoxon test and the second on the test of means.  The time 
unit is one month. The averages and fractions are across the 16 combinations of methods of de-tending and 
detecting turning points. Differences are contractions less expansions. In parentheses are the results using the 
parameters (2,80) for the band-pass filter. 
 Table 6. Duration and violence of pre-war pig iron production 








Average difference  -0.20  -0.087  0.019  -0.094 
1877-1929  Fraction of rejections 









  Fraction of rejections 









Notes: In each cell, the first row is based on the Wilcoxon test and the second on the test of means.  The time 
unit is one month. The averages and fractions are across the 16 combinations of methods of de-tending and 
detecting turning points. Differences are contractions less expansions. 
 
 
Table 7. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same duration of expansions and contractions 
  Linear detrended  Polynomial detrended  Band-pass filtered  Modified HP-filtered 
   t-statistic  W-statistic 
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
  
t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.111 0.135 0.210 0.434 0.235 0.249 0.111 0.135 
Production            
  Reversal  0.228 0.465 0.207 0.395 0.067 0.073 0.222 0.294 
            
  Bry-  Boschan  0.082 0.294 0.112 0.461 0.099 0.057 0.110 0.334 
            
  0.146 0.022* 0.167 0.022* 0.287  0.274  0.127 0.022* 
 
Regime-
s w i t c h i n g           
Employment  Window  0.004** 0.034* 0.005** 0.034* 0.009** 0.029* 0.006**  0.057 
R a t e             
  Reversal  0.001** 0.009** 0.004**  0.029*  0.129  0.096  0.004**  0.029* 
            
  Bry-  Boschan  0.001** 0.005** 0.002** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 
            
  0.039* 0.135 0.049* 0.200  0.125  0.117 0.040* 0.200 
 
Regime-
s w i t c h i n g           
Notes: The p-values refer to the tests in tables 1a to 1d. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 Table 8a. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, linear detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.359 0.388 0.224 0.190 0.464 0.471 
Production          
  Reversal  0.257 0.262 0.173 0.136 0.475 0.491 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.446 0.409 0.259 0.179 0.381 0.440 
          
  0.116  0.143 0.004**  0.002** 0.175  0.186 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.049* 0.020*  0.002**  0.002** 0.090  0.068 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.002** 0.004** 0.001** 0.001**  0.014*  0.006** 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.012*  0.004** 0.004** 0.004**  0.027*  0.016* 
          
  0.032* 0.094  0.000**  0.000**  0.030* 0.068 
 
Regime-
switching        





Table 8b. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, polynomial detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.360 0.364 0.232 0.239 0.498 0.443 
Production          
  Reversal  0.155 0.170 0.156 0.158 0.325 0.381 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.369 0.289 0.307 0.336 0.437 0.487 
          
  0.106  0.050 0.001**  0.001** 0.170  0.146 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.044* 0.020*  0.001**  0.002** 0.078  0.035* 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.003** 0.011* 0.001**  0.001** 0.016*  0.013* 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.006** 0.006** 0.001** 0.001**  0.023*  0.013* 
          
  0.036* 0.124  0.000**  0.000**  0.038* 0.102 
 
Regime-
switching        
Notes: The p-values refer to the tests in table 2b. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 Table 8c. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, band-pass detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.343 0.299 0.208 0.210 0.430 0.421 
Production          
  Reversal  0.249 0.289 0.141 0.113 0.298 0.305 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.253 0.289 0.170 0.179 0.315 0.317 
          
  0.115  0.115 0.001**  0.003** 0.157  0.186 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.279 0.245 0.126 0.092 0.325 0.305 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.279 0.330 0.127 0.092 0.309 0.359 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.149 0.198 0.077 0.068 0.202 0.245 
          
  0.166  0.224 0.001**  0.001** 0.107  0.126 
 
Regime-
switching        





Table 8d. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, modified-HP  detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.410 0.428 0.258 0.190 0.427 0.428 
Production          
  Reversal  0.309 0.364 0.302 0.275 0.415 0.373 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.474 0.491 0.335 0.308 0.350 0.440 
          
  0.091  0.050 0.001**  0.001** 0.173  0.186 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment Window  0.060  0.038*  0.003**  0.002**  0.104  0.068 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.003** 0.008** 0.001** 0.001**  0.016*  0.016* 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.008** 0.004** 0.001** 0.003**  0.025*  0.013* 
          
  0.017* 0.050  0.000**  0.000**  0.027* 0.068 
 
Regime-
switching        
Notes: The p-values refer to the tests in table 2d. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
  
Table 9. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same duration of expansions and contractions 
  Linear detrended  Polynomial detrended  Band-pass filter  Modified-HP filtered 
   t-statistic  W-statistic
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic
  
t-statistic W-statistic
Industrial  Window  0.05 0.07 0.11 0.33 0.23 0.28 0.06 0.06 
Production            
  Reversal  0.17 0.43 0.14 0.30  0.04*  0.07 0.19 0.24 
            
  Bry-  0.04*  0.23 0.05 0.37 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.27 
  Boschan          
  0.27 0.09 0.30 0.11 0.43 0.43 0.31 0.15 
 
Regime-
switching          
Employment  Window  0.00**  0.01**  0.00**  0.01** 0.01*  0.03* 0.00** 0.02* 
R a t e             
  Reversal  0.00**  0.01**  0.00** 0.01*  0.09  0.10  0.00** 0.02* 
            
  Bry-  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
  Boschan          
  0.24 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.39 0.40 0.29 0.36 
 
Regime-
switching          
Notes: The p-values refer to the tests in tables 1a to 1d. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 Table 10a. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, linear detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.31 0.33 0.22 0.17 0.49 0.48 
Production          
  Reversal  0.18 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.48 0.43 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.41 0.36 0.25 0.19 0.35 0.45 
          
  0.26 0.29  0.05*  0.05 0.28 0.29 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.01** 0.00** 0.01** 0.01**  0.02*  0.01* 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.00**  0.00** 0.01*  0.02* 0.00**  0.00** 
          
  0.20 0.30  0.00**  0.00**  0.17 0.23 
 
Regime-
switching        





Table 10b. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, polynomial detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.30 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.46 0.39 
Production          
  Reversal  0.11 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.32 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.32 0.21 0.30 0.33 0.44 0.44 
          
  0.27 0.23  0.03*  0.02*  0.30 0.29 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**  0.02*  0.01** 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
          
  0.21 0.33  0.00**  0.00**  0.18 0.27 
 
Regime-
switching        
Notes: The p-values refer to the tests in table 2b. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 Table 10c. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, band-pass detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.24 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.35 0.34 
Production          
  Reversal  0.10 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.14 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.21 
          
  0.24 0.27  0.04*  0.06 0.24 0.27 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.15 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.12 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.20 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.04*  0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 
          
  0.31 0.36  0.02*  0.02*  0.20 0.23 
 
Regime-
switching        





Table 10d. Bootstrap p-values for tests of same violence of expansions and contractions, modified-HP detrended 
  Steepness   Sharpness   Slope   
  
  
t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic t-statistic W-statistic 
Industrial  Window  0.37 0.38 0.27 0.21 0.42 0.43 
Production          
  Reversal  0.26 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.37 
          
  Bry-Boschan  0.48 0.47 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.43 
          
  0.27 0.23  0.03*  0.02*  0.30 0.31 
 
Regime-
switching        
Employment  Window  0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01**  0.02*  0.01* 
R a t e           
  Reversal  0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
          
  Bry-  Boschan 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 
          
  0.20 0.27  0.01**  0.01**  0.17 0.26 
 
Regime-
switching        
Notes: The p-values refer to the tests in table 2d. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 Table 11. Maximum likelihood estimates and tests on a statistical model 
Panel A. Industrial Production 
Maximum-likelihood estimates  Estimates  Standard Errors 
  p1 0.9441  0.1147 
  p2 0.9198  0.1202 
  μ1 0.0053  0.0010 
  μ2 -0.0102  0.0024 
  σ1,pre 0.0124  0.0015 
  σ2,pre 0.0327  0.0029 
  σ1,post 0.0066  0.0007 
  σ2,post 0.0100  0.0014 
Likelihood ratio tests  Statistics  p-values 
  p1=p2 0.46  0.50 
  μ1= -μ2 2.71  0.10 
  μ1= -μ2, σ1,pre=σ2,pre, σ1,post=σ2,post 46.40**  0.00 
Panel B. Employment Rate 
Maximum-likelihood estimates  Estimates  Standard Errors 
  p1 0.9237  0.1056 
  p2 0.8869  0.1234 
  μ1 0.0009  0.0002 
  μ2 -0.0022  0.0005 
  σ1,pre 0.0019  0.0002 
  σ2,pre 0.0070  0.0007 
  σ1,post 0.0014  0.0001 
  σ2,post 0.0022  0.0003 
Likelihood ratio tests  Statistics  p-values 
  p1=p2 0.77  0.38 
  μ1= -μ2 5.66*  0.02 
  μ1= μ2, σ1,pre=σ2,pre, σ1,post=σ2,post 71.36**  0.00 
Notes: The likelihood function was maximised using a quasi-Newton method. * 
and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
  Figure 1: Contractions and expansions in the baseline case for output, employment and the NBERFigure 2: Average business cycle dynamics for output and employment in the baseline case
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Figure 3: Representative peak-to-peak business cycle dynamicsFigure 4: CDF’s for the duration of expansions and contractions in industrial production






































































Bandpass Filter Polynomial Trend Piecewise-Linear Trend Modified-HP TrendFigure 5: CDF’s for the duration of expansions and contractions in the employment rate
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Figure 9: Output and employment dynamics with choice of timing of technology changes
Figure 10: Output and employment dynamics with training or job search